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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Julian Martin Valencia pleaded guilty to battery
with the intent to commit a serious felony (rape). Mr. Valencia later filed a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, which the district court denied. The district court imposed a
unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed. On appeal, Mr. Valencia asserts the
district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In January of 2013, Sara Negrete reported to the Nampa police that Julian Martin
Valencia had sexually assaulted her.
PSI), p.2.)

(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter,

Ms. Negrete said that she was staying at her friend's house when the

assault occurred. (PSI, p.2.) Mr. Valencia was her friend's boyfriend. (PSI, p.2.) She
stated that Mr. Valencia entered her bedroom when she was sleeping and penetrated
her with his fingers two separate times. (PSI, p.3.) In her statement to the police, she
explained that during the incident, she told Mr. Valencia that she was going to scream if
he continued and told him to leave the room. (R., p.6.) She said he did leave at one
point, but came back "moments later" and penetrated her again. (R., p.6.)

She said

Mr. Valencia kept trying to convince her to have sex with him, and she kept telling him
"No." (R., p.6.) Additionally, she said Mr. Valencia tried to "flip her around" but she
used her strength to keep him from doing so, but was afraid that Mr. Valencia was going
to rape her. (R., p.6.) When Mr. Valencia left the bedroom again, she left her friend's
apartment and went to another friend's home where she called the police. (PSI, p.3.)

1

When interviewed regarding the incident, Mr. Valencia confirmed that he was at
his girlfriend's apartment despite the fact that there were three valid no contact orders
between them. (PSI, p.3.) Mr. Valencia said he had been drinking with Ms. Negrete
and his girlfriend and admitted that he went to Ms. Negrete's bedroom later and
penetrated her with his fingers. (PSI, p.3.) He was originally charged with battery with
intent to commit a serious felony to wit: rape, felony, in violation of I.C. § 18-911, and
violation of a no contact order (third offense within five years), felony, in violation of
I.C. § 18-920(3). (R., pp.8-10.) He was offered two plea agreement options: a binding
Rule 11 agreement for both charges or an offer to plead guilty to the battery charge
only. (Tr. 7/11/13, p.5.) He chose the latter. 1 (Tr. 7/11/13, p.5.) Therefore, in July of
2013, Mr. Valencia entered an Alford2 plea to the charge of battery with intent to commit
a serious felony, and the State agreed to dismiss the other charge and recommend four
years fixed with the indeterminate portion of the sentence to remain open for argument.
(Tr. 7/11/13, p.7.)
Shortly thereafter, in September of 2013, Mr. Valencia's counsel (Mr. Dowdy)
filed a motion to withdraw as counsel of record for Mr. Valencia. (R., pp.66-67.) In that
motion, he said that Mr. Valencia had requested that he file a motion to withdraw his
guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel.

(R., p.66.)

Mr. Dowdy also

stated that Mr. Valencia believed that he was not properly advised on the consequences

Judge Ford was initially presiding over the case because the no contact order violation
was assigned to him. (Tr. 7/11/13, p.6.) However, because Mr. Valencia decided to
plead guilty to the battery charge only, which was assigned to Judge Southworth, Judge
Ford asked Judge Southworth to step in. (Tr. 7/11/13, p.6.) He did so immediately, and
this obviously troubled Mr. Valencia, as his counsel said that he had anticipated that
Judge Ford would be handling the case, so he was apprehensive to move forward with
a plea because he had never been in front of Judge Southworth. (Tr. 7/11/13, pp.8-9.)
Nevertheless, he pleaded guilty. (Tr. 7/11/13, p.10.)
2 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
1

2

of

guilty plea, and that this rendered his plea involuntary

Therefore, Mr. Dowdy

unknowing.

to be allowed to withdraw, as it would

, p.66.)

"impossible to

further represent Defendant in his request for a withdrawal of plea on this basis." 3
(R., p.66.) At the hearing on the motion, the district court discussed that fact that it had
received a letter from Mr. Valencia.

(Tr. 10/21/13, p.6, Ls.1

)

In the letter,

Mr. Valencia threatened to file a complaint with the Idaho State Bar and said he was
"misled, misinformed, tricked, coerced, and threatened to plead guilty, and I intend to
prove this, Your Honor." (Tr. 10/21/13, p.8, Ls.5-9.) Subsequently, the district court
granted Mr. Dowdy's motion to withdraw as counsel.

(Tr. 10/21/13, p.8, Ls.1

R., pp.70-71.)
In December of 201

Mr. Valencia filed a motion to withdraw his guilty

through his newly-appointed public defender (Mr. Dowell).

(R., pp.73-76.)

In that

motion, he asserted that he felt "his prior counsel misled him which led him to enter a
guilty plea." (R., p.73.) Further, he argued that the State would not be prejudiced by
the withdrawal as the matter could be reset for trial.

(R., p.73.)

The motion also

explained that Mr. Valencia felt "pressured to accept the offered resolution and has
since determined that a jury trial would be a more appropriate resolution of the case"
because he did not feel that "he committed the crime as alleged." (R., p.75.)
At the subsequent hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea, Mr. Dowell
pointed out that Mr. Valencia was misled by his former counsel because there were
erroneous representations made to him regarding the persistent violator statute.
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There were indications that there was a lack of communication developing between
Mr. Valencia and Mr. Dowdy early on. For example, Mr. Valencia did not complete his
"Defendant's Version" of the incident for the PSI. Instead, he wrote "My attorney never
came to see me. He was supposed to come on the 8th of August to help me fill it out.
I'm sorry." (PSI, p.3.)
3

(Tr. 1

3, p.1

11-18.) In short, Mr.

Mr. Valencia had one prior felony conviction,

former counsel's representations

regarding the two instant offenses, Mr. Valencia came to believe that he could be
subject to the persistent violator enhancement if he did not plead guilty. (Tr. 12/30/14,
p.13, L.11 -p.14, L.19.)
Mr. Dowell explained that this was misleading because of established precedent
holding that convictions entered the same day or charged in the same information
should count as a single conviction for purposes of the persistent violator enhancement.
(Tr. 12/30/13, p.14, Ls.10-19.) Therefore, the violation of the no contact order and the
battery charge would count as a single conviction only.

Thus, he suggested that

Mr. Valencia's prior counsel made inaccurate representations to him that led him to
plead guilty instead of opting to proceed to trial. (Tr. 12/30/13, p.14, Ls.3-25.) In sum,
he said Mr. Valencia felt "manipulated" to plead guilty based on the representations of
his prior counsel. (Tr.12/30/13, p.14, Ls.20-22.)
The State argued that the case law was clear with respect to the fact that when
the district court decides on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea after the presentence
investigation is complete, it should look more "skeptically" on that motion and the
motives behind it.

(Tr. 12/30/13, p.15, L.12 - p.16, L.4.)

Additionally, it said that

Mr. Valencia worked with several members of the public defender's office (apparently in
addition to Mr. Dowdy), including Mr. Dowell, for a "considerable amount of time" before
accepting the plea agreement that he took.

(Tr. 12/30/13, p.16, Ls.5-21.)

And the

district court noted that there was no "threat by the State to file the persistent violator
because that was not part of the plea agreement." (Tr. 12/30/13, p.16, Ls.22-25.)
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argued that there would

The State
was granted.

prejud

to the

if Mr.

It stated that this case was different because "this isn't a dope

or "a theft case of a store. This is a case involving a situation where the defendant
is charged with battery with the intent to commit a serious felony, to wit, rape."
(Tr. 12/30/13, p.17, Ls.3-11.)

Therefore, there was a "victim who goes through the

victim cycle." (Tr. 12/30/13, p.17, Ls.16-19.) Based on that, the State asserted that
"while there may not be a ton of prejudice because I have to go back and try this case,
there certainly is prejudice to the victim" because "she now has to relive the night in
question, even though she's been given that opportunity to move forward, that obviously
provides prejudice." (Tr. 12/30/13, p.18, Ls.1

)

In reply, Mr. Dowell said that, when he first started working with Mr. Valencia and
discussing the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, Mr. Valencia told him that he had not
yet seen the presentence investigation or the psychosexual evaluation as of yet.
(Tr. 12/30/13, p.19, Ls.12-24.)

More importantly, with respect to the prejudice issue,

Mr. Valencia's counsel pointed out that "the psychological issues that the alleged victim
may have in this matter" did not amount to prejudice to the State. (Tr. 12/30/13, p.20,
Ls.14-20.) He argued that the State was not prejudiced because "they can still call their
witnesses to trial.

All their witnesses should still be available."

(Tr. 12/30/13, p.20,

Ls.20-23.)
The district court said that the motion to withdraw the guilty plea was "only filed
after a very negative psychosexual evaluation was performed and a presentence
investigation report that recommended prison."

(Tr. 12/30/13, p.21, Ls.13-16.)

Additionally, it said that it believed there was prejudice to the State, "specifically
prejudice to the victim in this case thinking this matter had reached a resolution and the
5

was going forward." (Tr. 12/30/13,
motion

1,

) Thus it denied

the matter for sentencing. (Tr. 12/30/1

Ls.

)

At the sentencing hearing, the State requested that the district court impose a
unified sentence of twenty years, with four years fixed.

(Tr. 1/10/14, p.33, Ls.2-6.)

Mr. Valencia's counsel recommended that the district court impose a unified sentence of
six years, with one and one-half years fixed, but retain jurisdiction so that Mr. Valencia
could participate in a rider program and sex offender treatment. (Tr. 1/10/14, p.37, L.23
p.38, L.9.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with four years
fixed. (Tr. 1/10/14, p.44, Ls.22-25; R., pp.94-95.) Mr. Valencia filed a notice of appeal
that was timely from the judgment of conviction.

(R., pp.100-103.)

He also flied an

Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion requesting leniency, but the district court denied that
motion as well. 4 (R., pp.86-93, 110-113.)

Because no new information was presented with the Rule 35 motion, Mr. Valencia is
not challenging its denial.

4
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ISSUE

district court
his guilty plea?

its discretion when it denied Mr. Valencia's motion to

7

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Valencia's Motion To
Withdraw His Guilty Plea

A

Introduction
Mr. Valencia asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied his

motion to withdraw his guilty plea because he showed a just reason to withdraw the
plea, and there was no prejudice to the State. Mr. Valencia showed a just reason to
withdraw his plea because, based on inaccurate representations of counsel, he did not
understand his options, and this rendered his plea involuntary and unknowing. Also,
allowing Mr. Valencia to withdraw his plea would not have prejudiced the State.
Exercising a constitutional right to a jury trial, and requiring the State to prove its case
beyond a reasonable doubt - even if it requires the victim to undergo the unpleasant
experience of testifying or being uncertain of the outcome - does not amount to
"prejudice."

B.

Standard Of Review
Motions to withdraw a guilty plea are governed by Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c).

"The decision to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is left to the sound discretion of
the district court," and that discretion should be "liberally applied." State v. Arthur, 145
Idaho 219, 222 (2008). An appellate court reviews the denial of a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea to determine "whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as
distinguished from arbitrary action." Id.
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Mr. Valencia Showed A Just Reason To Withdraw His Guilty Plea Because His
Plea Was Not Made Voluntarily, Knowingly, And Intelligently
When a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is made

a defendant

only has to show a "just reason" to withdraw the plea. State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 799,
801 (1988). However, if the motion is made before sentencing but "after the defendant
has learned of the content of the PSI or has received other information about the
probable sentence, the district court may temper its liberality by weighing the
defendant's apparent motive." Arthur, 145 Idaho at

Also, if the State can show

prejudice as a result of the withdrawal, a motion to withdraw the plea will be denied.
Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 61 (2004). But even if granting the motion would not
prejudice the State, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea may

denied if the defendant

has not presented and supported a "plausible reason for withdrawal of the plea."
State v. Akin, 139 Idaho 160, 162 (Ct. App. 2003).
A defendant can show a just reason to withdraw a guilty plea if his plea was
involuntary. State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-536 (Ct. App. 2008). 'The first
step in analyzing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is to determine whether the plea
was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made." Id. (citing State v. Rodriguez, 118
Idaho 957, 959 (Ct. App. 1990)).

"If a plea was not taken in compliance with

constitutional due process standards, which require that a guilty plea be made
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, then ... 'just reason' will be established as a
matter of law." State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 330, 333 (Ct. App. 2009). A plea complies
with these standards when:
(1) the plea was voluntary in the sense that the defendant understood the
nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) the defendant knowingly
and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to confront adverse
9

and to avoid self-incrimination; and
understood the consequences of pleading guilty.
State

Huffman, 137 Idaho 886, 887 (Ct App.

(3) the defendant

"However,

defect in the plea is not necessary in order to show .

constitutional

a 'just reason'" Id.

If an

appellate court determines that a plea was constitutionally valid, it then proceeds to
determine whether any other just reason exists for withdrawal of the plea. Rodriguez,
118 Idaho at 95.
Here, Mr. Valencia's plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because, as
a result of being misinformed about the law regarding the persistent violator statute, he
pleaded guilty. Mr. Valencia believed that he could

subject to the persistent violator

statute if he did not plead guilty because his former counsel gave him the impression
that the two crimes he was charged with would amount to his second and third felonies
for the purpose of the persistent violator statute. (Tr. 12/30/13, p.13, L.11

p.14, L.19.)

This was not supported by the law; State v. Harrington, 133 Idaho 563 (Ct. App. 1999)
specifically states that, "convictions entered the same day or charged in the same
information should count as a single conviction for purposes of establishing habitual
offender status." Id. at 565. The district court focused on the idea that "there was never
any threat by the State to file the persistent violator because that was not part of the
plea agreement." (Tr. 12/30/13, p.16, Ls.22-25.) But this is irrelevant. Mr. Valencia
obviously believed, as a result of his prior counsel's erroneous representations, that if
he chose to go to trial, the State could later file an amended information with the
persistent violator enhancement. Therefore, he pleaded guilty.
Further, the State's argument that Mr. Valencia met with others from the public
defender's office is not persuasive, as Mr. Dowdy was his counsel of record until
October, and Mr. Valencia entered his plea months earlier, in July. (R., pp.70-71; see
10

1/13,

0.)

Mr. Valencia did not understand

the persistent

This indicates that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his rights to

jury trial,

and therefore he established that there was a just reason to withdraw his plea.

See

State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535-536.
Further, although the district court said that "the motion to withdraw the guilty
plea was only filed after a very negative psychosexual evaluation was performed and a
presentence investigation report that recommended prison," given Mr. Dowdy's
withdrawal, and the fact that another public defender had to be appointed, it is not
surprising that Mr. Valencia did not file his motion to withdraw his guilty plea until well
after the PSI and psychosexual evaluation were released. (Tr. 12/30/13, p.21, Ls.1316.) Therefore, in light of the evidence that Mr. Valencia was confused about whether
the persistent violator enhancement might apply, the problems he had with his first
public defender, and the fact that Mr. Valencia's subsequent attorney pointed out that
Mr. Valencia had not seen the PSI or the psychosexual evaluation when he first spoke
with him about filing the motion to withdraw the plea, the district court should not have
assumed an improper motive for filing the motion but should have applied its discretion
liberally. See Arthur, 145 at 222.

D.

Granting The Motion To Withdraw The Guilty Plea Would Not Have Prejudiced
the State, And The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Found That
There Was Prejudice To The State Based Only On The Fact That The Victim
Could Be Called To Testify
As indicated above, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea will be denied if the State

can show prejudice as a result of the withdrawal. Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 61
(2004 ). Prejudice to a party may occur when that party's ability to effectively present its
11

case is

delay, the destruction of evidence or unavailability of
v. Marion,

time

U.S. 307, 321 (1971 ). For example, if a significant

of

before a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is entered, prejudice to the State

could certainly occur. In State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 799 (1988), after entering a guilty
plea, the defendant did not appear for sentencing and was not apprehended until three
years later. Id. at 800. He subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court pointed out that the district court "recognized that generally
motions to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing are to be liberally allowed" but
noted with approval that the district court found that "Ballard's circumstances did not
warrant the granting of his motion."

Id.

It then quoted the district court, which

acknowledged that a liberal approach to such motions rests on "good principles," but
said that those principles "don't have much applicability where the defendant has
absented himself for period of some three years. I think that is a significant prejudice to
the prosecution and precludes the withdrawal of the plea at this point." Id.
Prejudice to the State is not relevant or applicable, however, when a victim must
testify as a result of a defendant asserting a constitutional right to trial.

Here, the

prosecutor actually acknowledged that there would not be prejudice to her as the State,
but then argued that there was "prejudice to the victim" because if the alleged victim had
to testify at a trial, she would have to "relive the night in question, even though she's
been given that opportunity to move forward, that obviously provides prejudice."
(Tr. 12/30/13, p.18, Ls.10-20.)

In reply, Mr. Valencia's counsel argued that "the

psychological issues that the alleged victim may have in this matter" were not relevant
because the issue "should be prejudice to the State." (Tr. 12/30/13, p.20, Ls.14-19.)
He said that the State "can still call all their witnesses to trial. All their witnesses should
12

still be

" (Tr. 12/30t1

p.20,

Nevertheless, the district court agreed

1

with the prosecutor. It said "[t]his Court

believe that there is prejudice to the State,

specifically prejudice to the victim in this case thinking this matter had reached a
resolution and the sentence was going forward."

(Tr. 12/30/13, p.21, L.23 - p.22, L.2.)

This was a fundamental misunderstanding of the principle of prejudice to the State. It
allowed a more relaxed standard for a finding of prejudice to the State in sex cases.
Indeed, the prosecutor even implied that because this was not a "dope case" or a "theft
case," a different standard should apply.

(Tr. 12/30/13, p.17, Ls.3-11.)

Cf. State v.

Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51-52 (2009) (clarifying that courts should not apply different
procedural rules in sex cases).
While victims' rights are crucial, a defendant's exercise of a constitutional right,
which requires that an alleged victim testify does not amount to prejudice to the State.
In fact, the United States Supreme Court, while recognizing that courts should "not
ignore the concerns of victims" especially "when the crime is one calling for public
testimony about a humiliating and degrading experience," made it clear that
"inconvenience and embarrassment to witnesses cannot justify failing to enforce
constitutional rights of an accused. When prejudicial error is made that clearly impairs a
defendant's constitutional rights, the burden of a new trial must be borne by the
prosecution, the courts, and the witnesses; the Constitution permits nothing less."
Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983). This admonition applies here.
Finally, as Mr. Valencia's counsel was obviously implying when he stated that the
issue "should be prejudice to the State," a victim being called to testify is not at all
unusual.

It is unfortunate that sometimes victims can be forced to recall painful

13

memories, but it is not prejudice to the State.

Therefore, the district court abused its

discretion by considering this as a factor in its denial of Mr. Valencia's motion.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Valencia respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of
conviction and remand his case to the district court with direction to grant his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.
DATED this 11 th day of August, 2014.
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